Rethinking Justice:
Levinas and Asymetrical Responsibility
Sarah Roberts
Abstract: Emmanuel Levinas argues that
justice is meaningful only to the extent
that other persons are encountered in their
individuality, as my neighbors, and not
merely abstract citizens of a political
community. That is, the political demand
for justice arises from my ethical
relationship with the other whose face I
cannot look past. But despite his
revolutionary ideas about the origins of
justice, Levinas ultimately appeals to a
very traditional view of justice in which
persons are considered equal and comparable,
and responsibilities and rights are
distributed evenly among them. In response
to Levinas, I argue that insofar as justice
is constructed by and for the relationship,
it must also be deconstructed by that
relationship. If one takes seriously
Levinas's claim that asymmetrical ethical
responsibility is the origin of justice,
then one must also reject Levinas's
suggestion that justice involves viewing
persons and responsibilities as comparable
and symmetrical.
Engendering Questions:
Developing Feminist Ethics With Levinas
Deidre Butler
Abstract: Levinas's often reflexive
internalization of female stereotypes, as well
as his reifications of particularly patriarchal
tendencies within the biblical and rabbinic
tradition in his dialogue with Jewish law and
thought, are only two of the many problems
feminists, and particularly Jewish feminists,
must address as they engage in his ethics.
Despite these difficulties, Levinas's compelling
description of the radical obligation to the
Other invites feminists to enter into dialogue
with his thought. This article explores the
possibilities of developing and enhancing
feminist ethics through the application of key
concepts and strategies found in the ethical
thought of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas's
conceptions of alterity, relationship, justice
and phenomenological uses of gender are
evaluated in terms of how they might be
appropriated by feminist ethics.
Zionism, Place, and the
Other: Toward a Levinasian International
Relations
William Paul Simmons
Abstract: This essay expands on the
recent writings on Levinas's politics by
discussing his explicit comments about
international relations. Levinas embraces
neither a naive idealism, nor a cold realism.
Instead, he searches for a third way, that is,
an oscillation between idealism and realism.
There is a place for realism, but the power of
the state must be held in check by the ethical
responsibility for the Other. This oscillation
is examined in relation to Levinas's writings on
"place" and Zionism. Levinas also calls for an
oscillation between the enrootedness to a place
or nation and the higher ethical responsibility
for the Other. The essay concludes with a
discussion of some very controversial remarks
Levinas made about the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.
Resisting Silence In
the Face of Evil: Re-Thinking the Holocaust,
Speaking the Unspeakable, With Emmanuel Levinas
Bob Plant
Abstract: In the following paper I shall
outline a number of preliminary ideas concerning
the relationship between the Holocaust and
certain themes which emerge in the works of
Emmanuel Levinas. As this relationship is
distinctly twofold, my analysis will include
both a textual and a rather more speculative
component. That is to say, while I shall argue
that reading Levinas specifically as a
post-Holocaust thinker clarifies a number of his
philosophical and rhetorical motifs, so, in
turn, does this challenging body of work offer a
means by which to re-think both the horror and
ethical significance of the Holocaust itself.
During the course of my argument I shall
additionally refer to the writings of Primo
Levi, Jacques Derrida and Martin Heidegger
through whom I hope also to establish the
central role guilt and confession play in
Levinas's own thinking.
Good Infinity/Bad
Infinity: Il y a, Apeiron, and the
Environmental Ethics in the Philosophy of
Levinas
Danne Polk
Abstract: Although Levinas does not
specifically articulate an environmental ethic,
he certainly has a concept of nature working
within his philosophy, a portrait of which can
be drawn from the various texts that describe in
detail what he believes to be the human,
primordial relationship to the elemental. The
following essay is an attempt to articulate how
Levinas comes to define that relationship, and
to imagine what kind of environmental ethic is
implied by it. We will see that an important,
dichotomous distinction is made between two
types of infinity, the "bad infinity" of the
sacred and the "good infinity" of the holy.
This distinction corresponds to the separated
subject's world. For Levinas, this distinction
addresses not only the rationalist vs.
empiricist question concerning the relationship
between consciousness and the body, a guiding
question for modern philosophy from Descartes
through Husserl, but also the question
concerning technology, especially as it is posed
by Heidegger and other twentieth century
continental philosophers. These two related
questions can help guide us to an understanding
of how Levinas imagines environmental
imperatives toward both the body's exclusive
relationship to nature, and to the interpersonal
relationships between the self and other human
beings. We will begin this analysis with
Husserl's answer to the question of
consciousness.
Emmanuel Levinas on God
and Philosophy: Practical Implications for
Christian Theology
Robyn Horner
Abstract: This paper concerns the
possibility of "thinking" God, and uses the work
of Emmanuel Levinas to frame a contemporary
approach to some of the problems involved. The
difficult relationship between philosophy and
Christian theology is noted, before Levinas's
thought is examined as it relates to that which
both marks consciousness and exceeds it.
Levinas's adoption of the "idea of the Infinite"
and his exploration of two ways in which the
Infinite might signify (have meaning) open up a
useful trajectory for a thought of God which is
not reductive. At the same time, however, this
aporetic approach raises difficulties in
the context of specific religious traditions.
Three problems as they occur for Christian
theology are examined in light of Levinas's
work: the problem of not being able to identify
an experience of God as such; the problem of the
infinite interpretability of revelation; and the
problem of understanding the divinity of Jesus
Christ.
Talmud, Totality, and
Jewish Pluralism: A Comment Inspired by Reading
Emmanuel Levinas
Laura Duhan Kaplan
Abstract: Levinas's conception of
listening for the "trace" of the infinite
implies that the human spirit grows when it
comes into contact with something greater than
it had previously known. When Levinas reads the
Talmud, sourcebook of Jewish Law, he tries to
enter into conversation with it, allowing the
meaning of the text to expand to touch his own
contemporary concerns. At the flip side of his
expansion, however, lies my worry that the text
functions as a " totality," assimilating all
contemporary concerns to its discussions. At
this time of rebuilding in Jewish history, Jews
cannot afford narrow conceptions of Jewish
practice. This essay does not attempt to
elucidate Levinas's thought, but to use some
insights gained from reading his work to think
about contemporary Judaism.
Levinas, Theistic
Language, and Psychology: A Cautionary Note
David R. Harrington
Abstract: Emmanuel Levinas has provided
the philosophical basis for psychologies
commensurate with the ethical basis of human
existence; however, introducing psychologists to
his work is frustrated by a number of factors.
One of these factors is his use of theistic
language in his philosophical writings. Two
problems are discussed regarding this language.
First, contemporary psychology, including the
area of psychology of religion, rejects any
theistic language as incompatible with an
empirical science. Second, it is suggested that
many persons, including psychologists, are not
in the cognitive developmental stage at which
they can understand Levinas's writings about
God. Further, it is also suggested that
psychology's history warns against creating a
psychological school or division based in
Levinas's thought. The article concludes with a
general discussion regarding how psychology can
apply Levinas's thought while leaving God and
Levinas behind.
Difficulty and
Mortality: Two Notes on Reading Levinas
Richard A. Cohen
Abstract: I argue against the work of
simplifying and applying Levinas's thought.
Simplifying Levinas misses the point of the
greatness of his thought, which is addressed to
the most sophisticated philosophical thinkers of
his day, and calls upon them to re-ground
philosophy in the ethical. Applying Levinas
misses the point that Levinas's conception of
alterity is perfectly concrete, because it is
linked to morality through the mortality of the
other.
Volume 7,
Numbers 2-3, Summer-Fall 2000
Symbolic Meaning and
the Confederate Battle Flag
Torin Alter
Abstract: The Confederate Battle Flag
(CBF) is in the news again. On January 16th,
2000, 46,000 people came to Columbia, South
Carolina, to protest its display over the
state's capital dome. On July 1st,
the CBF was removed. But on the same day, it
was raised in front of the Statehouse steps.
The controversy has received a great deal of
media coverage and was a factor in the 2000
presidential primaries. CBF displays raise a
philosophical question I wish to address: What
determines whether a symbol or symbol-display is
racist? I will focus on the CBF because its
contemporary relevance. But the discussion will
shed light on the general issue of when a symbol
or symbol-display has a particular meaning and
when it does not.
Minorities and Racist
Symbols: A Response to Torin Alter
George Schedler
No Abstract
Kant and the Problem of
Ethical Metaphysics
Anthony F. Beavers
Abstract: The ethical philosophies of
Kant and Levinas would seem, on the surface, to
be incompatible. In this essay I attempt to
reconcile them by situating Levinas's philosophy
"beneath" Kant's as its existential condition
thereby addressing two shortcomings in each of
their works, for Kant, the apparent difficulty
of making ethics apply to real concrete cases,
and, for Levinas, the apparent difficulty of
establishing a normative ethics that can offer
prescriptions for moral behavior. My general
thesis is that the existential ethical terrain
unearthed by Levinas turns Kantian when
transposed into the rational order.
Buridan's Ass and Other
Dilemmas: A Decision-Value Approach
Wesley Cooper and
Guillermo Barron
Abstract: The dilemma confronted by
Buridan's Ass leads into a problem about
nil-preference situations, to which there is a
solution in the literature that is inspired by
Alan Turing: we have evolved with a
computational module in our brains that comes
into play in such situations by picking a random
action among the alternatives that determines
the subject's choice. We relate these Buridan's
Ass situations to a larger, theoretically
interesting category in which there is no
alternative that is decisively superior to
others with respect to expected utility, and we
try to show how our emotional makeup figures in
a rational response, particularly as informed by
symbolic utility that we draw down from our
culture's shared understandings. The category
is theoretically interesting because it contains
moral dilemmas, as well as hard cases in which
an important choice must be made without an
option that has clearly superior expected
utility. We argue that our Emotional Response
Model is preferable to Turing's Randomizer for
this category, as well as more illuminating
about nil-preference situations or close
approximation thereto.
Towards an Ethics of
Time: Eschatology and its Discontents
Andrew Fiala
Abstract: This essay does not argue for
any specific conception of time as ethically
superior or significant, but argues that the
conception of time we choose from among possible
such conceptions has ethical consequences.
Hairstyles and
Attitudes: Hacking, Human Kinds, and the
Development of Punk Rock
Andrew Latus
Abstract: Much of Ian Hacking's recent
work has concerned the notion of 'human kinds',
that is, ways of classifying people as objects
of study in the human and social sciences. In
this paper, I use a study of the development of
a particular kind of person--the
punk rocker-- to clarify and
extend the idea of a human kind. With regard to
clarification, this case provides an excellent
opportunity to consider examples of what Hacking
calls 'looping effects', i.e. particular kinds
of interactions between ways of classifying
people and those who are classified. As for
extending Hacking's ideas, in punk we see a sort
of kind creation largely absent from the
examples he has considered. While the human
kinds Hacking has focussed on typically emerge
from investigations by experts and then filter
out into popular consciousness, in punk we see
the opposite process take place.
Utopian Liberalism: A
Response to my Colleagues
Roger Paden
No Abstract
Logic in a Pincers
Herman E. Stark
Abstract: The essay challenges the de
facto dichotomy between the discipline of
logic and the activity of social criticism,
i.e., it provides an illustrated reminder to
philosophers that the gulf between these two
areas of philosophy is not quite as wide as our
curriculum and specialization designations tends
to suggest. Social criticism plays some
necessary roles in certain branches of logic,
and the second-order accounting of the contents
of these branches leads back to social
criticism. These points suggest an adjusted
conception of logic that would, among other
things, render phrases such as "applying logic
to social criticism" as misleading since certain
branches of logic would not even coherently
exist apart from social criticism. The lead
illustrations are the identification of basic,
pervasive, and thought-impeding logical errors
that have been missed by numerous logic texts,
and the assessment of contemporary academic
logic as properly a quest for communal sanity
that lies caught between communal insanity and
communal mendacity.
Hestian Thinking in
Antiquity and Modernity: Pythagorean Women
Philosophers and 19th Century Domestic
Scientists
Patricia J. Thompson
Abstract: Thompson (1994) proposed a
re-visioning of the oikos/polis dichotomy
in classical philosophy. She offers a dual
systems paradigm, based on two ancient Greek
mythemes-Hestia, goddess of the oikos, or
domestic "homeplace," and Hermes, god of the
polis, or public "marketplace" as an
alternative to gender as the primary analytic
lens to advance feminist theory. This paper
applies hestian/hermean lenses of analysis,
described in two propadeutic papers (SPCW 1996;
1997), to the writings of 6th-5th century BCE
Pythagorean women philosophers and 19th century
domestic scientists to claim them as moral
philosophers of the hestian domain.
Volume 7,
Number 4, Winter 2000
Socrates, the
Marketplace, and Money
Trevor Curnow
Abstract: It is often supposed that the
example of Socrates makes the taking of payment
for philosophical services problematic. This
supposition is examined on the basis of the
evidence available in Plato's Apology and
Xenophon's Memorabilia. These texts
suggest that Socrates certainly had reservations
about the desirability of receiving payment in
return for philosophical services. However,
these reservations do not amount to an outright
and unconditional condemnation. Furthermore,
some of the reservations derive from the
particular values of the culture in which
Socrates lived and should not be seen as binding
to all. Similarly, whatever specific objections
Socrates may have had to the activities of the
Sophists should not be seen as applicable to all
philosophers who accept payment in return for
their services.
Plato on Philosophy and
Money
Paul W. Gooch
Abstract: For Plato, one mark of the
difference between sophistry and philosophy is
that the sophist takes fees for service. His
Socrates does not. However, this paper points
out that Socrates' attitude to money reflects
his unique indifference to things bodily, and a
more satisfactory understanding of Plato on
money needs to turn to his discussion of the
love of money or avarice, especially in the
Republic. Plato locates money-loving in
appetitive soul along with physical cravings
like hunger and lust; why he should do so is
explained if avarice is seen as a primary
instance of a more pervasive possessiveness that
is ultimately somatic in nature. I argue that
though his remedies are too severe, Plato is
right to warn against avarice and its possible
effects upon the practice of philosophy. And
following Plato I conclude that philosophy is
best understood as an enquiry unconstrained by
the interests of the market and carried out in
the context of academic freedom.
Philosophy and
Money-Making
Marco Iorio
Abstract: This essay argues that there is
no obvious reason not to make money doing
philosophy. Whether philosophical counseling is
justified, however, depends on the practitioners
of the service defining the benefit of that
service.
Absolutism and
Relativism: Practical Implications for
Philosophical Counseling
Andrew M. Koch
Abstract: This article raises the
question of whether or not a "neutral" stance
can be found from which to engage in
philosophical counseling. By drawing on the
debate between absolutism and relativism, it is
argued that no such neutral ground exists. The
foundational premises of the transcendentalist
tradition involve different assumptions than
those of the materialist and relativist
traditions. Such a distinction goes back to the
earliest days of philosophy and today the new
profession of philosophical counseling must
address the multiplicity of assumptions upon
which philosophic discourse can be built. The
paper concludes with a call for philosophical
counseling to move beyond the focus on Socrates,
and to embrace a wide variety of different
positions within it domain.
Are Counselors and
Therapists Prostitutes ? A Dialogue
Rupert Read and Emma
Willmer
No Abstract
Socrates in the Agora:
Philosophy as Private Good and Public Act
Jon Borowicz
Abstract: Philosophical counseling
recommends to its clients the activity of
philosophical dialogue. The process of thought
in dialogue differs from private thought in the
greater physical constraints placed upon
dialogue. We as yet do not have an
understanding of the embodied activity of
philosophy sufficient to make viable the
marketing of philosophical counseling as a
service. The paper is a contribution to such an
understanding. The paper considers the notion
of a philosophical life and criticizes the
possibility of a profession of philosophical
counseling. It ends with a tentative defense of
philosophical counseling as a marketable
service.
Inculcating Virtue in
Philosophical Practice
Lou Marinoff
Abstract: This paper claims that the
edifice of philosophical practice bears prima
facie resemblance to other
counseling-dispensing professions--e.g.
medicine, law, psychology, accountancy. It
defends virtues of professionalism in
philosophical practice against accusations of
sophism, and also rejects social constructivism
as a politically extreme form of sophistry. It
concludes that, notwithstanding prima facie
resemblance to other counseling professions,
philosophical practice is foundationally
distinct from them. When elaborated, this
distinction complicates the notion of
inculcating virtue in philosophical practice.
Philosophy at the Core
of Economic Markets
Karl Reinhard Kolmsee
Abstract: The
market seems to have substituted politics as a
coordination model in modern societies. While
philosophy's complementarity to politics is
well-acknowledged, its importance for economic
markets can be questioned. Economics deals with
optimization, but as markets are constituted by
real person with individual beliefs and
normative values the economic tool box is not
sufficient to describe market behavior. This
especially true whenever technological
innovations challenge established market rules.
Philosophy supplies analytical instruments for a
better, more complete description of markets
including their normative aspects. For this
complementary function philosophy should be
placed at the core of any theory of markets.
Volume 8,
Number 1, Spring 2001
Compassion:An
Aristotelian Approach
Trudy C. Conway
Department of Philosophy
Mount St. Mary’s College
Emmitsburg, MD
Conway@msmary.edu
Abstract:The following three papers focus
on compassion, an issue well worth our
consideration in our contemporary age, and most
especially during our recent national tragedy.
It is hoped that these philosophical discussions
of compassion may help us as we, on personal and
societal levels, come to grips with immense
human suffering. The topic of compassion brings
us to an exploration of a cluster of related
philosophical issues and is thus a good stepping
off point for inquiry. The role of the first
paper is that of stage setting, to simply lay
out an approach to compassion presented by
Aristotle and developed by Martha Nussbaum.
This approach served as the introductory
consideration in a course on compassion taught
by the first two commentators. Initially, we
wondered if we could sustain discussion on this
narrow topic over fourteen weeks, but found the
course left students with numerous questions
worth their further consideration. So too in
these papers, a number of issues will remain
untouched, such as the relation of compassion
and public policy and specific approaches to the
cultivating of compassion, both of which are
explored at length by Martha Nussbaum. This
first paper frames our discussion, by presenting
in outline form key points addressed in Martha
Nussbaum’s Aristotelian discussion of the
emotion of compassion, and touches upon issues
developed in the next two papers.
A Buddhist Critique of
Nussbaum’s Account of Compassion
Jeremiah Conway
Department of Philosophy
University of Southern Maine
Portland, ME 04104-9300
jconway@maine.rr.com
Abstract:This paper examines Martha
Nussbaum’s account of compassion from the
perspective of Mahayana Buddhism. It focuses on
the three criteria of compassion set forth by
Nussbaum in a number of her works, and shows why
Buddhism would reject each of them. The paper
concludes that Nussbaum’s analysis of compassion
is more accurately described as an account of
pity.
Barriers to Feeling and
Actualizing Compassion
Lani Roberts
Department of Philosophy
Oregon State University
Corvalis, OR 97331-4503
LRoberts@orst.edu
Abstract:Hume and Rousseau argue that
“feeling with and/or for others” is natural and
basic to us as human persons, but Royce claims
that merely feeling the fleeting impulse of
sympathy is not the moral insight itself.
Compassion must be both felt and acted upon for
it to play the role in morality ascribed by Hume
and Rousseau. Why is it so often the case that
we fail to feel compassion for others and, even
when we do, why do we often fail to act on this
basis? There are multiple socially constructed
barriers to feeling and acting on compassion,
three of which are discussed:null curriculum,
stereotyping, and privileges. Finally, the
Dalai Lama maintains that it is in every
person’s own self-interest to develop compassion
for others because it is the source of both
inner and external peace.
Is Coerced Fertility
Reduction to Preserve Nature Justifiable?
Frank W. Derringh
Department of Social Science (Philosophy)
New York City Technical College
300 Jay Street, N611
City University of New York
Brooklyn, New York 11201
Abstract:Human population growth must
end, and the sooner the better, for both nature
and a humanity that pursues boundlessly
increasing affluence. Poisoning of organisms
and massive extinctions result, exacerbated by
population momentum. Infliction of pain and
death largely for trivial reasons constitutes
the ignoble dénouement of our history. Reducing
human numbers would be only one fitting response
to recognition of this situation. Reliance on
voluntary socio-economic reforms, including even
the empowerment of women, appears unlikely to
lead to below-replacement-level fertility, since
families on average still elect to have more
than two children. Discussed are three reasons
for thinking that coercive measures could help
us to engender a decreasing human population
without negating preferable voluntary efforts to
the same end. Hence some coercion to reduce
fertility is justifiable.
Virtuality and
Morality:On (not) Being Disturbed by the Other
Lucas D. Introna
Centre for the Study of Technology and
Organisation
University of Lancaster Management School
Lancaster, United Kingdom
L.Introna@lancaster.ac.uk
Abstract:This paper critically describes
the mediation of social relations by information
technology, drawing on the work of Emmanuel
Levinas. In the first of three movements, I
discuss ethical relations as primordial
sociality based in proximity. In the second
movement I discuss how the self encounters the
Other, the ethical contact. How can the self
make contact with the Other without turning the
Other into a theme, a concept, or a category?
In the third movement, I discuss the electronic
mediation of the social as simulation. I argue
that simulation shatters proximity, since it
transforms expression, the trace, into
presentation, an image. I argue that the
distance produced by the mediation increases the
potential for the Other to become appropriated
by the self-certain ego as a theme, according to
its categories. In simulation, proximity is
shattered and the ego can no longer be
disturbed—no longer become a hostage. In a
final section, I explore alternative arguments
for the possibility of electronic mediation that
preserves the trace, that possibility of being
disturbed.
The Case Against
Reparations
Stephen Kershnar
Department of Philosophy
Fenton Hall
SUNY—Fredonia
Fredonia, NY 14063
Stephen.kershnar@fredonia.edu
Abstract:George Schedler raises
interesting issues with regard to the amount of
reparations owed for slavery, the parties who
are owed reparations, and the standard for these
reparations. His arguments, however, do not
hold up upon analysis. His analysis of the case
for the descendants of slaves being owed
compensation seriously overestimates the case
for such reparations. He does not identify the
grounds for such compensation, i.e., either
stolen inheritance or the descendents’
trustee-like control over the slave’s estate,
and this results in his not identifying the
metaphysical and epistemic problems that
accompany the descendant’s claim to
reparations. In analyzing whether the U.S.
government owes compensation, Schedler provides
arguments on its small role in bringing about
slavery and the break in national identity that
followed the Civil War. Such arguments fail but
his conclusion can be supported by other
arguments, specifically the nature of the
federal government’s relation to slavery and the
limited nature of its powers. Thus, the case
against reparations is overwhelming but nor for
the reasons Schedler thinks.
The Logical Mistake of
Racism
Joseph W. Long
Philosophy Department
Purdue University
1360 Liberal Arts and Education Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1360
jlong@purdue.edu
Abstract:In this paper, I will explore
and attempt to define one very important type of
egregious discrimination of persons, racism. I
will argue that racism involves a kind of
logical mistake; specifically, I hope to show
that racists commit the naturalistic fallacy.
Finally, I will defend my account of racism
against two challenges, the most important of
which argues that of racism is merely a logical
error, then racists are not morally culpable.
Concessions to Moral
Particularism
Susan M. Purviance
Philosophy Department
The University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606-3390
spurvia@utnet.utoledo.edu
Abstract:In this paper, I examine the
particularist attack on deductive use of moral
principles, reviewing the critiques of the
uniformity of moral reasons and impartiality in
ethics, looking principally at arguments from
Larry Blum, Jonathan Dancy, and Margaret
Walker. I defend the action-guiding-ness of
moral principles themselves, but consider
various ways to accommodate the objections
coming from particularism. I conclude that one
objection to the impartialist theory of value
must be conceded without qualification:
generalism is unable to account for the unique
and irreplaceable value of individual persons.
I present an example which supports my view and
shows that, in the context of lived experience,
replaceability is contradicted. Indeed there
may be few constants of value in the narrative
of one’s life, as experiences overlay supposed
constants with continual new shading, and create
even deeper sorts of transformation in valuing.
In the end, both particularized moral judgment
and the articulation of fact with principle
contribute to moral discernment.
Curing Iranian
Occidentosis: Jalal Al-e Ahmad’s Poly-Methodic
Prescription
Karen G. Ruffle
Department of Religious Studies
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill, NC
Abstract:In this paper, I shall argue
that during the period from the end of World War
II until just before the Islamic revolution of
1979, a body of literature emerged critiqueing
the petro-colonialism of the United States and
select European countries, which infected Iran
with a severe case of “occidentosis.” This set
the stage for the revolution, and a presentation
of the principle author of occidentosis, Jalal
Al-e Ahmad, will facilitate understanding of the
Iranian intellectual tradition.
Values and
Science:Dewey and Pragmatist Inquiry
Andrew Ward
School of Public Policy
685 Cherry Street
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, GA 30332-1345
Andrew.ward@pubpolicy.gatech.edu
Abstract:This essay argues for a
pragmatist notion of inquiry which ties together
science and morality into a seamless whole, pace
David Hume, Gilbert Harman, and others who would
separate science and morality as different kinds
of inquiry.
Volume 8,
Number 2, Fall-Winter 2001
What is Environmental
Virtue Ethics that We Should Be Mindful of It?
Geoffrey B. Frasz
Philosophical and Regional Studies Department
Community College of Southern Nevada
6375 W. Charleston,
Las Vegas, NV 89146.
frasz@nevada.edu
Abstract:There has been increased
interest in developing what I call environmental
virtue ethics (EVE). This paper presents some of
the central features of this project. The first
part is a general description of EVE, showing
why there is a need for it. The second part
spells out the central features of EVE including
an account of the good life as flourishing in an
expanded or mixed biotic community, and provides
a tentative list of important environmental
virtues. The third part examines one virtue:
friendship, showing how an understanding of it
provides insight into current issues in
environmental ethics. The final section
addresses a challenge to the project of EVE.
Environmental Virtue
Ethics: An Aristotelian Approach
Eugene Schlossberger
Purdue University Calumet
Hammond, IN 46323
Esschlos@nwi.calumet.purdue.edu
Abstract:This paper articulates a
framework, “E,” for developing ethical claims
about environmental issues. E is a general
framework for constructing arguments and working
out disputes, rather than a particular theory.
It may be deployed in various ways by writers
with quite different views to generate diverse
arguments applying to a broad panoply of issues.
E can serve as a common language between those
who adopt anthropocentric and
non-anthropocentric standpoints. E is
anthropocentric in the sense that it begins with
ideas about human excellence and human
interests. Arguments employing E suggest that
we, as human beings, have certain duties
regarding the environment. Since it may also be
true that various duties attach to being an
organism of any stripe, that nature has
intrinsic value, and so forth, arguments
employing E can be seen as supplementing, rather
than replacing, non-anthropocentric moral
arguments. Moreover, E is anthropocentric in
its methodology but not necessarily in its
results. Some accounts of human excellence yield
the sorts of obligations that biocentrists
advocate. As a result, arguments employing E can
have force with both those who adopt and those
who reject non-anthropocentric standpoints.
Inner Diversity: An
Alternative Ecological Virtue Ethics
Jason Kawall
Department of Philosophy and Religion
232 Holt Hall
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga
Chattanooga, TN 37403
Jason-Kawall@utc.edu
Abstract:I propose a modified virtue
ethics, grounded in an analogy between
ecosystems and human personalities. I suggest
that we understand ourselves as possessing
changing systems of inter-related
subpersonalities with different virtues, and
view our characters as flexible and evolving.
Neo-Confucian
Cosmology, Virtue Ethics, and Environmental
Philosophy
Donald N. Blakeley
Department of Philosophy
California State University, Fresno
Fresno, CA 93726
donald_blakeley@csufresno.edu
Abstract:This paper explores the extent to which
the Confucian concept of ren (humaneness) has
application in ways that are comparable to
contemporary versions of environmental virtue
ethics. I argue that the accounts of
self-cultivation that are developed in major
texts of the Confucian tradition have important
direct implications for environmental thinking
that even the Neo-Confucians do not seriously
entertain.
Environmental Virtue
Ethics With Martha Stewart
William J. Ehmann
Director, Center for Earth and Environmental
Science
Plattsburgh State University-SUNY
101 Broad Street
Plattsburgh, NY 12901
bill.ehmann@plattsburgh.edu
Abstract:Renewed philosophical discourse
about virtue ethics motivates the search for
examples to inform and extend our thinking. In
the case of environmental virtue ethics, I have
decided to consult “America's Lifestyle Expert,”
Martha Stewart. Oft dismissed as a pop icon or
model of domesticity, Martha's business success
is arguably a result of her claimed authority on
what the good life entails and how we get it.
Reviewing over 60 signed “Letters From Martha”
from her monthly magazine Martha Stewart Living,
(MSL) I explored her presentations of current
environmental topics including biodiversity,
obligations to animals, gardening, global
warming, and reliance on technology. I find that
her work ultimately makes managing a household
interesting, and encourages her public to take
personal pride in everyday tasks done well.
These are trademark Martha Stewart “good
things.” Moreover, by connecting with a large
audience few philosophers or scientists ever
court, she is poised to help us manage our
larger planetary household (sensu Gr. “oikos”)
and frame a quality of life for future
generations.
Comments on Frasz and
Cafaro on Environmental Virtue Ethics
Thomas Hill, Jr.
3158 Chicken Bridge Road
Pittsboro, NC 27312
Thill@email.unc.edu
Abstract:Professor Hill delivered these
comments as part of the International Society
for Environmental Ethics panels on Environmental
Virtue Ethics, held at the annual meeting of
the Pacific Division ofthe American
Philosophical Association, April 2000, in
Albuquerque, NM. Philip Cafaro’s paper “Thoreau,
Leopold and Carson: Toward an Environmental
Virtue Ethics” appears in Environmental Ethics
23 (2001), 3-17. Geoffrey Frasz’s paper “What is
Environmental Virtue Ethics That We Should Be
Mindful of It?” is published as part of this
special issue of Philosophy in the Contemporary
World.
A Morally Defensible
Aristotelian Environmental Ethics: Comments on
Gerber, O’Neill, Frasz and Cafaro on
Environmental Virtue Ethics
James Sterba
Department of Philosophy
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, IN 46556
James.p.sterba.1@nd.edu
Abstract:Professor Sterba delivered these
comments at the International Society for
Environmental Ethics panels on Environmental
Virtue Ethics, at the annual meeting of the
Pacific Division of the American Philosophical
Association, April 2000, in Albuquerque, NM. The
papers by L. Gerber, J. O’Neill and G. Frasz are
published in Philosophy in the Contemporary
World 8:3. P. Cafaro’s paper “Thoreau, Leopold
and Carson: Toward an Environmental Virtue
Ethics” was published in Environmental Ethics 23
(2001): 3-17.
Attunement: An
Ecological Spin on the Virtue of Temperance
Louke van Wensveen
Department of Theological Studies
Loyola Marymount University
Los Angeles, CA
lvanwens@lmu.edu
Abstract:Within an environmental virtue
ethic belongs moderation for the sake of
ecojustice. Named attunement, this virtue both
resembles and differs from Aristotelian and
Thomistic articulations of temperance.
Principally expressed as frugality and
moderation in diet, it includes: sensitivity to
limits, acceptance of limits, joyous
contentment, creativity, and readiness to
sacrifice.
Environmental Virtues
and Public Policy
John O’Neill
Centre for Philosophy
Institute for Environment, Philosophy and Public
Policy
Lancaster University
Lancaster, LA1 4YG,
United Kingdom
j.oneill@lancaster.ac.uk
Abstract:The Aristotelian view that
public institutions should aim at the good life
is criticized on the grounds that it makes for
an authoritarian politics that is incompatible
with the pluralism of modern society. The
criticism seems to have particular power against
modern environmentalism, that it offers a local
vision of the good life which fails to
appreciate the variety of possible human
relationships to the natural environment, and
so, as a guide to public policy, it leads to
green authoritarianism. This paper argues to the
contrary that an Aristotelian position which
defends environmental goods as constitutive of
the good life is consistent with recognition of
the plurality of ways our relations to the
natural world can be lived. It is compatible
with the recognition of distinct cultural
expressions of such relations and of the special
place particular histories of individuals and
social groups have in constraining environmental
policy.
The Art of Intimacy
Lisa Gerber
University Honors Program
University of New Mexico
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87110
gerber@unm.edu
Abstract:This paper is an exploration of
intimacy with non-human nature. I show that
intimacy is like friendship in that it is a
close and familiar relationships that develops
over time and is marked by care and concern.
Just as we have good reasons to value and
promote friendships, we also have good reasons
to value and promote intimacy with non-human
nature.
The Virtues of Hunting
Jon Jensen
Green Mountain College
Poultney, VT 05764
jensenj@greenmtn.edu
No Abstract
Sport Hunting,
Eudaimonia, and Tragic Wisdom
James A. Tantillo
Department of Natural Resources
Cornell University
8 Fernow Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
jat4@cornell.edu
Abstract:Anti-hunters frequently overlook
or underestimate the positive values associated
with reflective sport hunting. In this essay I
characterize the value of hunting in the context
of an Aristotelian virtue ethic. Sport hunting
done for the purpose of recreation contributes
heavily to the eudaimonia (flourishing) of
hunters. I employ Aristotelian insights about
tragedy to defend hunting as an activity
especially well- suited for promoting a range of
crucial intellectual and emotional virtues.
Reflective sport hunters develop a “realistic
awareness of death” and experience what may be
called “tragic” pleasure, which yields the
important intellectual virtue of tragic wisdom.
Virtue Ethics and the
Material Values of Nature
Kari Väyrynen
Academy of Finland
Department of History
University of Oulu
P.O. Box 1000
90014 Oulu, Finland
kari.vayrynen@oulu.fi
Abstract:For Aristotle, man is part of
nature, a “political animal” with the faculty of
reason. In this sense, Aristotelian virtue
ethics can be said to relate virtues to nature.
On the one hand, virtues lean on the natural
dispositions of man as a social animal. On the
other hand, virtues are connected to praxis,
that is, with man’s active realization of his
inherent biological, social and cultural
potential. Recently, the material value ethics
of Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann developed
the Aristotelian tradition in a naturalistic
direction, posing the problem of the value of
life and connecting this question to the
question of virtue. Virtues sensitize us to
values and are, therefore, especially important
for ethical praxis. I claim that precisely
because of its historical and cultural
concreteness, virtue ethics can be successfully
applied to environmental issues. In critical
connection with common mentalities, naturalistic
virtue ethics can be a politically effective way
of ethical thinking. Furthermore, we can avoid
the trap of relativism by suggesting strong
environmental values and virtues. An example
would be the health of ecosystems and of humans.
Analogical Extension
and Analogical Implication in Environmental
Moral Philosophy
Jeremy Bendik-Keymer
Philosophy Department
University of Chicago
1010 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
jbendik@uchicago.edu
Abstract:Two common claims in
environmental moral philosophy are that nature
is worthy of respect and that we respect
ourselves in respecting nature. In this paper, I
articulate two modes of practical reasoning that
help make sense of these claims. The first is
analogical extension, which understands the
respect due human life as the source of a like
respect for nature. The second is analogical
implication, which involves nature in human life
to show us what we are like. These forms of
reasoning are relevant to environmental virtue
ethics in that both help us conceptualize how
respect for nature can be part of our sense of
humanity, and not opposed to our sense of
humanity.
The Naturalist’s
Virtues
Philip Cafaro
Department of Philosophy
Colorado State University
Fort Collins, CO 80521
cafaro@lamar.colostate.edu
Abstract:This paper argues that studying
natural history helps make us more virtuous;
that is, better and happier people. After
sketching a broad conception of virtue, I
discuss how naturalizing may improve our moral
character and help develop our intellectual,
aesthetic and physical abilities. I next assert
essential connections between
non-anthropocentrism and wisdom, and between
natural history study and the achievement of a
non-anthropocentric stance toward the world.
Finally, I argue that the great naturalists
suggest a noble, inspiring alternative to the
gross consumption and trivial pleasures offered
by our destructive modern economy: the
exploration, understanding and appreciation of
nature. I conclude that a better understanding
of our enlightened self-interest would do as
much to further environmental protection as the
acknowledgment of nature’s intrinsic value.
Volume 9, Number
1, Spring-Summer 2002
Is Practical Philosophy
for Private Profit or Public Good?: A Critical
View of the Practical Turn in Contemporary
Philosophy
Patricia
Shipley
Emeritus Reader in Occupational Psychology
University of London
Fellow, British Psychological Society
Fellow, Society for the Furtherance of the
Critical Philosophy
pat.shipley@virgin.net.uk
Fernando Leal
Professor of Philosophy & Social Science
University of Guadalajara, Mexico
Fellow, Society for the Furtherance of the
Critical Philosophy
Abstract:
This paper takes a critical look at the rise of
the practice of philosophy in the market place
in late modernity. Two main forms of such
practice are identified: the practice of
Socratic Dialogue in small groups in
organisations and one-to-one philosophical
counselling of individual ‘clients'. The
relevance of professionalism for commercialised
applied practical philosophy is discussed.
Philosophical counsellors in particular may be
at risk of engaging with vulnerable individuals
who are in need of protection from practitioners
who are not trained to deal with their problems.
Psychology is the discipline which is most
related to practical philosophy and it is
growing in ethical awareness. This paper
emphasises the importance of ethics for
philosophy in practice. There is a pressing need
for eternal vigilance by practitioners from such
disciplines, whether professionalised or not, in
the complex modern ‘runaway world'.
Dennett and the Quest
for Real Meaning: In Defense of a "Myth"
David Beisecker
Department of Philosophy
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Las Vegas, NV 89154 USA
beiseck@un.edu
Abstract:
In several recent pieces, Daniel Dennett has
advanced a line of reasoning purporting to show
that we should reject the idea that there is a
tenable distinction to be drawn between the
manner in which we represent the way things are
and the manner in which "blessedly simple"
intentional systems like thermostats and frogs
represent the way things are. Through a series
of thought experiments, Dennett aims to show
that philosophers of mind should abandon their
preoccupation with "real meanings as opposed to
ersatz meaning, 'intrinsic' or 'original'
intentionality as oppose to derived
intentionality." In this paper, I lay out the
case that Dennett builds against original
intentionality, with the aim of showing that,
once it has been properly clarified, the notion
of original intentionality isn't nearly the myth
that Dennett makes it out to be.
Making A Game of Killing: Fantasy, Reality and
the Violence at Columbine High School
Suzanne Laba Cataldi
Department of Philosophy
Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville
Edwardsville, Illinois 62026-1433
scatald@siue.edu
Abstract:
This paper focuses on the
disturbing mixture of fantasy with reality in
the massacre at Columbine, where the
perpetrators appear to have made a game or ‘fun'
of their killing. Because of the deception
involved and despite their immersion in violent
media, I argue that they could not have been
totally confused about the difference between
play and actual violence. Huizinga's notion of
play and Merleau-Ponty's reversibility thesis
are applied to the situation.
Ethicists as
Architects: Revising Moral Theory Using All the
Tools
Jean Chambers
Department of Philosophy
SUNY Oswego
Oswego, NY 13126
jchambe1@oswego.edu
Abstract:
As James Coleman and Allan Gibbard have
suggested, human morality may be viewed as a
feedback control system. Each of the standard
normative ethical theories emphasizes only part
of this complex system. Social reform requires
both new theoretical syntheses and a practical
effort to better uphold ideal norms.
Information Ethics: An
Environmental Approach to the Digital Divide
Luciano Floridi
Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Computer
Science
and Programme in Comparative Media Law and
Policy
Oxford University.
Wolfson College, Oxford, OX2 6UD, UK.
luciano.floridi@philosophy.oxford.ac.uk
No Abstract
"WHY I HARDLY READ
ALTHUSSER:" READING HABERMAS HARDLY READING
ALTHUSSER
J. M. Fritzman
Department of Philosophy
Lewis & Clark College
Portland, Orgon 97219-7899
fritzman@lclark.edu
Abstract:
Habermas lapses into ethical socialism, but
Althusser's version escapes Habermas'
criticisms. While Habermas lapses into
scientism, Althusser does not. Resistance to
Althusser causes Habermas to either misread him
or not read him at all. Theoretical and
practical theses are proposed. The final section
analyzes why this article responds so
aggressively.
Socrates, Plato and the
Tao
Edward J. Grippe
Humanities Department
Norwalk Community College
Norwalk, Connecticut 06854
EGRIPPE@NCC.COMMNET.EDU
Abstract:
This paper is a reconsideration of Platonic
dialogues in the light of Taoist insights. The
application of Socratic Ignorance to the entire
corpus of Plato reveals the yin and yang not
only in the internal dialogue between Socrates
and Plato, but also between Plato and his
reader. Furthermore, this approach brings to the
surface the necessity of the dialectic relation
between the yang of Western analysis and the yin
of Asian intuition to the revelation of the Tao.
Art and Religion in the Age of Denounced
Master-Narratives
Vladimir Marchenkov
School of Comparative Arts
Ohio University
Athens, OH 45701-2979
marchenk@ohio.edu
Abstract:
Religious art within postmodernism is discussed.
Postmodern art, I argue, projects the myth of a
miraculously generating chaos which cannot be
maintained as absolute and therefore postmodern
art cannot be genuinely religious. The myth is
adopted for ideological, not philosophical
reasons and calls for alternatives to make
religious art possible.
Why Aren't Moral People
Always Moral? An Argument for Considering
Personality as the Foundational Link Between
Biology and Context
Patricia Trentacoste
Department of Philosophy
Oakland University
Rochester, MI 48309-4401
Trentaco@oakland.edu
Abstract:
In order or reduce internal dissonance and
emotional pain, the personality plays a causal
role in confabulating consistency among our
beliefs, values and actions. To the extent that
we are unaware of our own moral "blind spots," a
prima facie duty to engage in self-knowledge
exists. Only then can we reduce injustices
incurring from moral arrogance.
Volume 9,
Number 2, Fall-Winter 2002
Cultural Recognition: Problematizing the Western
Discourse of Multiculturalism
Courtney E. Cole
Binghamton University
Binghamton, New York
courtneyecole@hotmail.com
Abstract:
When assessing the history of Afrikaners
domination in South Africa and its current
fragile status in the new dispensation, what
becomes clear is that their claims for cultural
recognition and protection turn contemporary
Western discourse regarding multiculturalism on
its ear. In this paper, I organize my discussion
of recognition of Afrikaners in contemporary
South Africa by first giving some background on
Afrikaners, as well as their history and current
status in South Africa. I go on to examine how
the notions of "cultural identity" and "cultural
worth" problematize and complicate these ideas
as they are employed in Western discourse of
multiculturalism.
The Issue of the
Cosmopolitan Identities and the Third Way
between Cultural Embeddement and Liberal
Autonomy
Krassimir Stojanov
Federal Armed Forces University Hamburg
Holstenhofweg 85 22043
Hamburg , Germany
Krassimir.Stojanov@UniBw-Hamburg.DE
Abstract:
This paper attempts to develop an alternative to
both classical liberal claims about individual
autonomy and communitarian claims about cultural
embeddement of the individual. It shows a way to
develop a new model of subjectivity through an
interpretation at the level of a deeply located,
coherent